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Abstract 
Ad Hoc wireless sensor network (WSN) is a collection 
of nodes that do not need to rely on predefined infra-
structure to keep the network connected. The level of 
security and performance are always somehow related to 
each other, therefore due to limited resources in WSN, 
cryptographic methods for securing the network against 
attacks is not feasible. Byzantine attacks disrupt the 
communicat ion between nodes in the network without 
regard to its own resource consumption. This paper dis-
cusses the performance of cluster based WSN comparing 
LEACH with Advanced node based clusters under byzan-
tine attacks. This paper also proposes an algorithm for 
detection and isolation of the compromised nodes to mit -
igate the attacks by non-cryptographic means. The 
throughput increases after using the algorithm for isolation 
of the malicious nodes, 33% in case of Gray Hole attack 
and 62% in case of Black Hole attack. 
Keywords : byzantine attacks, cluster based wireless 
sensor network, advanced node, gray 
hole, black hole, non-cryptographic 
1. Introduction 
Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) is a type of Ad Hoc 
networks having large number of the nodes. The nodes of 
the WSN may be static or mobile as in case of other Ad 
Hoc networks. The wireless sensor networks pose unique 
challenges as the sensor nodes are limited in their energy, 
computation and communicat ion capabilities. A lso, the 
sensor nodes are deployed in inaccessible areas to monitor 
physical environment. The sensor nodes may be thousands 
in number to co llect ively monitor an area. As a result, the 
existing security mechanisms are inadequate [1]. Since all 
the nodes in an area usually detect common phenomenon, 
this leads to high data redundancy.  To  save energy and 
prolong network lifetime, an  efficient way is to aggregate 
the raw data before they are transmitted to the base station 
as the sensor nodes are resource limited and energy con-
strained. Data aggregation is an essential paradigm to 
eliminate data redundancy and reduce energy consumption 
[2-3]. The level of security and performance are somewhat 
related to each other. A WSN applicat ion usually requires 
different functionalities, sensing, storing data, and data 
communicat ion. Sensing usually require a large number of 
nodes to ensure coverage and few resources on each node. 
In contrast, data transmission and data storage require 
more system resources.  
Data aggregation is an essential parad igm to eliminate 
data redundancy and reduce energy consumption. The data 
ag-gregation is used in WSN to reduce the communication 
overhead and prolong the network lifetime. However, an 
adversary may compromise some nodes and use them to 
forge false values as the aggregation result. For securing 
data aggregation, we need to detect the malicious nodes 
which add to overhead due to encryption, decryption and 
sharing of keys.  
Tiered network design with functional partit ion pro-
longs network lifet ime instead of homogeneous network. 
Clustering in WSN, where groups of sensor nodes select 
their cluster head depending on the energy level [4, 14] or 
in some applications the cluster can be fixed at the time of 
deployment [5]. Whether the cluster head is pre-decided or 
selected by the individual nodes of the group the network 
will be ad hoc in either case.  
For many applicat ions, the sensed readings are sens i-
tive and thus demand for data security, confidentiality, 
integrity and freshness. However, the tight resource con-
straints of wireless sensors restrict the adoption of tradi-
tional computation intensive algorithms. A compromised 
storage agent may reveal its saved readings, drop im-
portant readings, compose forged data readings and reply 
old data readings. Without carefully designed security 
enhancements, the above attacks can leave the network 
useless in a hostile environment. There is no secure 
boundary in Ad Hoc networks, making the network sus-
ceptible to attacks, since Ad Hoc networks suffer from 
all-weather attacks which may  come from any node in the 
network. There are other link attacks also which can 
jeopardize the Ad Hoc network [6]. These include eaves-
dropping, active interfering and leakage of secret infor-
mat ion, data tampering, message reply, message contam-
ination and denial of service attacks . 
The attacks where aim is to gain control over WSN 
nodes by some unrighteous means and then using these 
compromised nodes to execute further malicious actions. 
The threats of such attacks are usually from inside the 
network and these threats are more dangerous than the 
threats from outside the network. These attacks are diff i-
cult to detect as they come from compromised nodes , 
which behave well before they are compromised. A good 
example of this type of threats comes from the potential 
Byzantine failures encountered in the routing protocol for 
the ad hoc networks. In a Byzantine failu re, a  set of nodes 
are compromised in such a way that the incorrect and 
malicious behaviour cannot be directly detected because of 
the cooperation among these compromised nodes when 
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they perform malicious behaviours. The compromised 
nodes may seemingly behave well; however they may 
actually make use of the flaws and inconsistencies in the 
routing protocol to undetectable destroy the routing fabric 
of the network, generate and advertise new routing in-
formation that contain non-existent link, provide fake link 
state information, o r even flood other nodes with routing 
traffic. 
It is common in ad hoc networks that benign failures 
such as path breakages, transmission impairments and 
packet dropping, happen frequently. Hence malicious 
failures will be more difficult to detect especially when 
adversaries change their attack pattern and their attack 
target in different periods of time. 
1.1. Attacks in Ad Hoc Networks 
There are numerous types of attacks in ad  hoc network, 
which may be classified into two types, external attacks 
and internal attacks. External attack, in which  the attacker 
aims to cause congestion propagate fake routing infor-
mat ion or d isturb nodes from providing services. In in-
ternal attack, in which the adversary wants to gain access 
to the network act ivities, either by some impersonation or 
by directly  compromising a current node and using it  as 
basis to conduct its malicious behaviors [7]. In an internal 
attack adversary can capture some nodes in the network 
and make them look like benign nodes, these  nodes  join 
the network as the normal nodes and begin to conduct the 
malicious behaviors like propagating fake routing infor-
mat ion and begin inappropriate priority to access some 
confidential informat ion [22]. The internal attacks are 
sometimes more severe threat to the security than external 
attacks as they are difficult to detect at an early stage. 
1.2. Routing Attacks 
Routing attacks are classified into two categories: at-
tacks on routing protocols and attacks on packet for-
warding. The main influences brought by the attacks on 
routing include network partit ion, route loop, resource 
deprivation and route hijack. Because of the mobility and 
constantly changing topology of the mobile ad hoc net-
works, it is very difficult to validate all the route messages 
as a result, impersonating another node to spoof route 
message, advertising false route metric to misrepresent 
topology, flooding route discovery, modifying route reply 
message, generating bogus route error to disrupt a working 
route, suppressing route error to mislead others may occur. 
In packet forwarding/delivery  selfishness and deni-
al-of-Serv ice are the two main strategies applied for the 
attack. 
1.3. Byzantine Attacks 
When a network device suffers a byzantine fault it is 
assumed to be controlled by an adversary who uses the 
device to disrupt the network [16]. The goal of the Byz-
antine node is to disrupt the communicat ion of other nodes 
in the network, without regard to its own resource con-
sumption. These cause Byzantine failu res which include 
the omission failures and commission failures. As for 
instance in omission failures if a  node fail to receive a 
request or fail to send a response and in commission fail-
ures if a node process a request incorrectly or sending an 
incorrect or inconsistent response to a request. In Ad Hoc 
networks, the Byzantine attacks are as: Black Hole attack, 
Gray Hole attack, Flood Rushing attack and Wormhole 
attack. Wireless sensor networks are favorite targets of 
Byzantine attacks because of their limited dynamic to-
pology etc. [21]. 
1.4. Black Hole Attack  
It is a basic Byzantine attack [9] where adversary stops 
forwarding data packets, but still participates in the routing 
protocol correctly. As a result, whenever the adversarial 
node is selected as part of a path by the routing protocol, it 
prevents communication on that path. Most routing pro-
tocols are disrupted by Black Hole attacks because they 
render the normal methods of route maintenance useless . 
1.5. Gray Hole Attack  
It is a special case of black hole attack where an at-
tacker could create a grey hole, in which it is selectively 
drops some packets but not others, for example forwarding 
some packets but not data packets[10]. 
1.6. Wormhole Attack  
If more than one node is compromised, it is reasonable 
to assume that these nodes interact in order to gain an 
additional advantage. This allows the adversary to perform 
a more effective attack. One such attack is Byzantine 
Wormhole where two adversaries tunnel packets between 
each other in order to create a shortcut (or Wormhole) in 
the network. The adversaries can send a route request and 
discover a route across the Ad Hoc network, then tunnel 
packets through the non-adversarial nodes to execute the 
attack. The adversaries can use the low cost appearance of 
the wormhole links in order to increase the probability of 
being elected as part of the route and then attempt to dis-
rupt the network by dropping all of the data packets. The 
Wormhole attack is strong attack which can be performed 
even if only two nodes are compromised. 
1.7. Flood Rushing Attack  
A flood rushing attack [12] explo its the flood duplicate 
suppression technique used by many routing protocols. 
This attack takes place during the propagation of legit i-
mate flood and can be seen as a “race” between the le-
gitimate flood and the adversarial variant of it. If an  ad-
versary successfully reaches some of its neighbors with its 
own version of the flood packet before they receive a 
version through a leg itimate route, then those nodes will 
ignore the legitimate version and will propagate the ad-
versarial version. Th is may result in  the continual ab ility to 
establish an adversarial-free route, even when authentica-
tion techniques are used. 
When a node wants to send a packet, it will send route 
request packet and if it receives a route reply first from a 
normal behaving node, then everything will work fine. 
However, if it gets reply from an attacker node, all the 
packets will not reach the destination or there may be 
selective dropping. In both the cases the delivery ratio will 
decrease. Therefore, identification of such nodes is the 
first step in preventing their participation in the data 
transfer. Also, a route reply from an attacker node can 
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reach the source node earlier than a normal node if it is 
near to the source node. Since each node in a homogene-
ous WSN, acts as router, the data transmission from source 
to the gateway occurs via different sensor nodes, while in 
case of heterogeneous network the indiv idual nodes may 
or may not participate in the routing process .  
The homogenous WSN can be treated as a special case 
of ad hoc networks where the number o f nodes is very 
large as compared to the ad hoc network. The detection 
and isolation of an attacker node is difficult. Also, the 
packet delivery ratio will be lesser. In heterogeneous WSN 
the nodes are grouped in clusters and each node in the 
cluster transmits its data via the cluster head (CH) [4, 14]. 
Since the nodes in cluster are fewer as compared to the 
nodes in a homogeneous WSN the chances of detection 
and isolation of the attacker node are more. 
Karlof et al. [13] proposed selective forwarding attack 
for the first time in wireless sensor networks and suggested 
that multipath forwarding to counter the attack. But, the 
algorithm fails to suggest a method to isolate the attacking 
node. Marti et al. [11] p roposed a technique called 
Watchdog, in which a node continuously monitors the 
neighboring nodes to which the packet is sent and to check 
whether the packet is fo rwarded or not. But the algorithm 
fails to detect the attacker in the presence of selective 
forwarding attack. 
2. Comparison LEACH and advanced node 
In Fig. 1, LEACH vs. Advanced node based network 
the probability of sustaining the black hole or gray hole 
attack is more in the advanced node based network as 
compared to LEACH based network. Also the life cycle of 
the nodes in Advanced node based network is more than 
the LEACH based network. During the cluster head s e-
lection process and after becoming cluster head the node 
consume almost n+1 times the energy consumed by an 
individual sensor node. Since data aggregation as well as 
the routing of the other informat ion from and to the nodes 
is carried through the cluster head, in addition to its own 
sensing and data transmission which leads to quicker en-
ergy depletion.  
 
Fig. 1 Advanced node based protocol vs. LEACH protocol. (Energy in mah  and time in 
days with 1 hour operation for each sensor node) 
3. Results and discussion 
In this work, we develop a non-cryptographic type of 
defense by checking the forwarding of the upstream nodes 
by overhearing their transmission. We consider Ad Hoc on 
demand vector routing protocol to implement these at-
tacks. 
In the Black Hole attack, a node will part icipate in 
routing but will drop all the packets  it receive [11]. The 
malicious node will always advertise in the network that it 
has a fresher route to the destination by setting the s e-
quence number to a large value and will reply to the 
broadcast route request packet before other nodes send a 
reply. Thus, the attacker node will attract all the traffic in 
its transmission range towards itself and then drop the 
packets. This type of situation will decrease the packet 
delivery rat io, but at the same time the energy of the black 
node will decrease rapidly resulting in self-immolation of 
the node. However, during the time of the data transmis-
sion the other nodes which send the packet to the black 
node will result in decrease of their energy due to repeated 
transmissions for the same packet. Th is will decrease their 
energy and result in reduced life cycle of the node. In Gray 
Hole attack, the attacker node drop selective packets ac-
cording to some criteria or randomly [4]. This type of 
attack is difficult  to detect, especially  in  wireless scenario 
where packets are dropped because of the congestion, 
channel capacity etc. This algorithm is based on the 
probability of attack which depends on the ratio of number 
of packets to the number of packets transmitted. If the 
probability of attack is greater than the probability of black 
hole attack and it is true twice then the attack is black hole 
attack and if the probability of attack is greater than the 
probability of gray hole attack and it is true twice then the 
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attack is gray hole attack. After the detection of the attack 
all the nodes are sent a broadcast not to include the node in 
any future routing for transmission of packets. The com-
plete algorithm for different scenario is given as under: 
Scenario: (As shown in Fig. 2) 
Case 1: Homogeneous ad hoc or wireless sensor network 
Wireless sensor network is a large network of sensors 
which have the ability to communicate with each other. 
These sensor nodes are transmitting the data from one sensor 
to another for further transmission to the sink node. In ad hoc 
networks Ad Hoc on demand vector is a source initiated 
advanced on demand routing protocol. Each sensor node has 
a routing table that stores the information of the next hop 
node to route the destination. When a source node wants to 
route a packet to sink node, it uses the specified route if a 
fresh route to the sink is not available otherwise it will update 
its table for shortest route by the route discovery using route 
request message to its neighboring nodes. In Gray-Hole at-
tack the malicious node selectivity or randomly forwards 
packets passing through it. Sink node after receiving packet 
from the source node, unicast (route reply) message en-route 
neighboring node from which it receives the packet. In 
Black-Hole attack, the malicious node pretends as if it has the 
shortest path to the sink node and drops all the packets. 
Case 2: Heterogeneous wireless sensor network with 
LEACH based cluster head 
The wireless sensor network is partitioned into clusters 
and each cluster consists of a group of sensor nodes which 
may or may not transmit data to the destination via the 
neighboring nodes. Mostly, the nodes communicate directly 
with the cluster head. The cluster head is chosen which is 
having the maximum energy level amongst the cluster nodes.  
As in LEACH the process of selecting or electing a cluster 
head is repeated after a certain interval of time. The number 
of nodes in a cluster is less as compared to the case 1 [14]. 
But the Gray-Hole and Black-hole attack is possible if the 
nodes communicate with the cluster head via intermediate or 
neighboring nodes. Also, the attacks are possible if the node 
which acts as cluster head is compromised. The severity of 
the attack may be manifold as all the data packets from each 
and every node will be dropped.  
Case 3: Heterogeneous wireless sensor networks with 
Advanced Node as cluster head 
The wireless sensor network is partitioned into clusters as 
in case of case 2 but the cluster head is predefined and the 
advanced node which acts as a cluster head is presumed to 
have higher energy, processing power and range [5] as 
compared to the normal sensor nodes. The possibility of 
Gray-Hole and Black-Hole attacks is less as compared to the 
case 1 or case 2. As it will be difficult to compromise the 
cluster head which is responsible for the transmission of the 
data from the nodes to the gateway. All the nodes will di-
rectly communicate with the cluster head, but as a special 
case the nodes may also communicate with the cluster head 
via the intermediate or neighboring nodes within that cluster. 
In the earlier case, the probability of compromising a node is 
lesser. Also, it is possible to use the cryptographic algorithms 
like key exchange mechanisms between the nodes and the 
cluster head during data transmission. 
4. Algorithm for detection and isolation of 
Byzantine nodes by non-cryptographic 
methods 
In either case of Byzantine attacks, Gray-Hole o r 
Black-Hole attack, the detection of the type of attack is 
first step. After we know the type of attack our next pr i-
ority is to identify the compromised nodes in the network. 
The algorithm detects these nodes by non-cryptographic 
methods, checking the forwarding of the nodes by over-
hearing their transmission and isolation of these nodes so 
that cannot take part in routing. The scenario is shown in 
Fig. 2.  
 
Fig. 2 Gray-hole and Black-hole attack detection and iso-
lation scenario 
4.1.   Assumptions 
Before the implementation of the algorithm we have 
taken certain assumption. Since there are many other fac-
tors which could cause the change in the throughput which 
we have taken as solely by the byzantine attacks. Like 
con-gestion due to buffer overflow is not insignificant, as 
we need to restrict the upstream node from delivering 
packets when the downstream node does not have suffi-
cient space. (b) In p ractical cases black hole attack may  not 
drop all the packets; it has its dependence on other factors 
as well. (c) As the signal power decreases the range is also 
decreased, but in case of WSN, the nodes are at a very 
short distances for a decrease in energy is not affected too 
much extend as compared to long distance communication. 
(d) In multi-hop communicat ion each node maintains the 
table of the routing informat ion during the transmission of 
packets, but here each node will be having additionally the 
attack table, this may add some overhead to the packets . 
a. No packet is dropped due to buffer overflow 
b. Black-Hole attack drops all the packets it receives  
c. Range is not getting affected by decrease in the energy 
level of a node 
d. Each node will maintain an attack table 
Notation and parameters 
nid Node identifier 
nt Total no. Of packets transmitted by a node 
nd Total no. Of packets dropped by a node 
nL Total packet loss 
nL= nt- nd 
Pa Probability of packets successfully received 
Pb Probability of presence of Black-Hole 
Pg Probability of presence of Gray-Hole 
Pa= nL/ nt 
Nr Reporter node 
NA Attacker node 
CH Cluster Head 
Cid Cluster id 
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4.1.1.   Algorithm for homogeneous network 
For a particular interval: 
1. Calculate value ofnL 
nL =  nL  - nd; 
2. Define values of Pb and Pg //Threshold values as 
per the scenario 
3. Calculate Pa 
Pa = nL/ nt; 
4. If (Pa >= 2Pb){ 
Then broadcast packets to all Ns and Rs with nid of 
both reporter node and attacker node. 
Type –of-attack = B;} 
else if (Pa >= 2Pg){ 
Broadcast packets to all Ns and Rs with nid of both 
reporter node and attacker node. 
Type-of-atack = G;} 
Else if (Pa>Pg and Pa >Pb){ 
Broadcast packets to all Ns and Rs with nid of both 
reporter node and attacker node. 
Type-of-attack = G;} 
Else{ 
Print(“No attacker node found”); and broadcast nid 
of sender node to all Ns and Rs”. 
Type-of-attack = nil;} 
4.1.2.   Algorithm dedicated cluster head  
Assumption is that cluster heads are pre assigned with 
identified cluster nodes. For a particular cluster and for a 
particular interval: 
1. Assign a node CID with maximum power 
2. Calculate value of nL for that particular cluster 
nL = nt – nL; 
3. Define value of Pb and Pg for a cluster 
4. Calculate Pa 
Pa = nL/nt; 
5. If (Pa >= 2Pb){ 
Broadcast packets to all Ns, rs and CH with nid of 
both Nr and NA 
Type-of-attack = B;} 
Else if (Pa >= 2Pg){ 
Broadcast packets to all other Ns, Rs and CH with 
nid of both Nr and NA 
Type-of-attack = G;} 
Elseif (Pa >Pg and Pa >Pb){ 
Broadcast to all Ns, Rs and CHs of cluster with n id 
of both Nr and NA 
Type-of-attack = G;} 
Else{ 
Print (“No attack found”) 
4.1.3.   Algorithm Heterogeneous Network  
Assumption is that network is div ided into clusters 
<=100. For a part icular cluster and for a part icular interval: 
1. Choose a node randomly as CH and assign Cid  
2. Calculate value of nL for that particular cluster 
nL = nt – nd; 
3. Define value of Pb&Pg for a cluster. 
4. Calculate Pa  
Pa = nL/nt; 
5. If (Pa >= 2Pb){ 
If (attacker nid = Cid of CH){ 
Broadcast packets to all other CHs with Cid of at-
tacker CH 
Type-of-attack = B;} 
Else { 
 Broadcast packets to all Ns, Rs and CH with nid of 
both Nr& NA. 
Type-of-attack = B;} 
Elseif( Pa>= 2Pg){ 
if (attacker nid = Cid) { 
     Broadcast packets to all CHs with Cid of attacker 
CH 
     Type-of-attack = G;} 
Else{ 
      Broadcast packets to all Ns and Rs and to CH of 
cluster with nid of both Nr and Na 
      Type-of-attack = G;} } 
Else if (Pa>Pg and Pa>Pb){ 
If(attacker nid = Cid){ 
 Broadcast packets to all other CHs with Cid of at-
tacker CH 
 Type-of-attack = G;} 
Else{ 
Broadcast packets to all Ns, Rs& CH with nid of 
both Nr and na 
  Type-of-attack = G;} } 
Else{ 
Print(“No attack found”); and broadcast 
nid of sender node to all Ns, Rs and CHs  
Type-of-attack = Nil; 
} 
5. Results based on the algorithm for detec-
tion and isolation 
From the simulation results as is evident from the Fig. 
4 throughput vs. time. In itially, we simulate the network 
with no attack;  the throughput is 90-95%. Then, as we 
introduce the black hole attack in the network, throughput 
decreases to 3%-5%. Now, as the network uses the isola-
tion algorithm, throughput increases to 67%. Similarly in 
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case of gray hole attack, initially we simulate the network 
without attack and the throughput is 90-95%. Then, we 
introduce the gray hole attack and the throughput  de-
creases to 35%-50%. After using the isolation algorithm 
the throughput increases to 88%. 
 
Fig. 3 time(s) vs. throughput (%) 
 
Fig. 4 time vs. throughput (%) 
6. Conclusion 
As shown in Fig. 3 and Fig. 4, there is remarkab le 
improvement in the throughput after using the proposed 
al-gorithm for isolation of the malicious nodes. The algo-
rithm will be more suited to the applications were we 
require to have energy efficient design. Since the algo-
rithm is a non-cryptographic one and purely depend on the 
probability of packets successfully received, therefore 
probability of presence of black hole nodes and probability 
of presence of gray ho le nodes may  vary in some cases. 
But the algorithm will be useful for the sensor networks 
where we can't use the cryptographic algorithms to tackle 
the security problem due to the fact that increased pro-
cessing and communication time will increase the energy 
consumption. 
If we part itioned the network into clusters then the 
gray hole or the b lack hole attack will remain  confined to 
its own cluster only without affecting the other clusters in 
the network till the cluster head itself is not compromised. 
But if we use the advanced node in the network as a cluster 
head then the probability of cluster head to be compro-
mised will be lesser due to the fact that the node is prede-
fined cluster head and we can also use the cryptographic 
mechanis ms like the key exchange etc. for secure trans-
mission with the processing to be done centrally at the 
cluster head (Advanced node), as it is having higher pro-
cessing, communication and energy as compared to the 
member nodes of the cluster. 
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